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Computer viruses pose an increasing risk to computer data
integrity. They cause loss of valuable data and cost an enor-
mous amount in wasted effort in restoration/duplication oflost
and damaged data. Each month many new viruses are re-
ported. .As the problem of viruses increases. we need tools to
detect them and to eradicate them from our systems.
This paper describes a virus detection tool: a generic virus
scanner in C++ with no inherent limitations on the file systems.
file types. or host architectures that can be scanned. The tool
is completely general and is structured in such a way that it
can easily be augmented to recognize viruses across different
system platforms with varied file types. The implementation
defines an abstract C++ class. Virlnfo. which encapsulates
virus features common to all scannable viruses. Subclasses
of this abstract class may be used to define viruses that infect
different machines and operating systems. The generality of
the mechanism allows it to be used for other forms of scanning
as well.
"This paper appears in the Proceedings of the 8th Computer Security Applica-
tions Conference. IEEE Press. 1992.
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1 Introduction
Computer viruses pose an increasing risk to computer data in-
tegrity. They cause loss of valuable data and cost an enormous
amount in wasted effort to restore or recreate damaged or destroyed
data. Each month new viruses are reported (cf. issues of The Virus
Bulletin and Virus News and Reviews). As the number of viruses
increases. we need tools to detect them and eradicate them from our
systems. While the problem of detecting. without error, all viruses
automatically is intractable[4], it is certainly feasible to detect sim-
ple, known viruses.
In this paper we describe a tool - a generic virus scanner in
C++ - that can run in a high integrity virtual memory environ-
ment and scan for viruses in files. These files can be available
either on the tool's host machine itself, available through a locally
mounted file system, or visible to it through an appropriate network
mount. For example, the testing machine could be a UNIX worksta-
tion accessing a DOS filesystem through its floppy disk interface or
remote-mounted on the workstation through a network (e.g., Novell
or PC-NFS). The rapid proliferation and use of network software in
the PC community has already created a need for such interfaces
whereby PC mounted file systems and file servers may be accessible
to more powerful workstations on the same local area network.
One common definition of a virus is as a segment of machine
code that installs a (possibly evolved) copy of itself into one or more
larger "host" programs[4].1 When the program is executed, the code
is activated and enables further spread of the virus, or destruction
of data, or both. The principal cause of this problem is the almost
nonexistent controls in most PC systems that allows user programs
to potentially gain complete control of the system. This allows virus
code to perform any operation, and to change any code or data.
Looking for viruses is not a simple matter of looking for extrane-
ous code. because it is not always obvious what is extraneous. Re-
cent "stealth viruses" make even this procedure difficult by ensuring
that the original contents of an infected file are returned when its
contents are requested as data for examination.2 It is more reliable
lather definitions may be found in the collections [7] and [10].
2See [8] for a good description of how stealth viruses operate.
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to test for infected files by using a system that partitions its pro-
cesses into distinct address spaces by a virtual memory translation.
This way we can avoid the effects of stealth and other memory res-
ident viruses on the scanning procedure. Better still would be the
use of a scanner on a completely different architecture - one that
cannot support the execution or spread of the searched-for viruses.
In such an environment, when a virus scanner running as a user
program requests bytes from a file for examination, it is assured of
the integrity of the bytes from influence by other user programs: in
no case can an ordinary user process modify the interrupt vectors
of devices or traps leading to system calls.
If one is testing for viruses on a diskette using a machine that
runs processes in their own virtual memory space, one can be rea-
sonably sure about the integrity of the memory. Similarly, boot
diskettes can be just as easily tested because we do not attempt
to boot from the diskettes and, in the process, compromise the in-
tegrity of the testing machine in any way. In short, by testing on a
machine with processes running in their own virtual address space
we ensure, with very high confidence, the integrity of the machine
on which we are doing the testing. This is similar to doing a high
integrity boot of a PC before scanning for viruses on it. Further-
more, if we are able to run our detector in a completely different
environment from the one containing the potential viruses, those
viruses cannot infect or interfere with our detector.
2 How viruses are detected
In this section we review current methods of virus detection and
end with the conclusion that detection by signature scanning still
remains the most simple, economical and commonly used tool for
virus detection.
2.1 Virus monitors/detection by behavioral abnormality
In this approach to virus detection, the machine is booted from
uninfected files and a virus monitor is installed that monitors vari-
0us activities of the machine while in day-to-day use. The program
monitors known methods ofvirus activity including attempts to in-
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fect and evade detection. 1his may also include attempts to write to
boot sectors. modify interrupt vectors. write to system files. etc.
Software monitors work best when the normal or day-to-day us-
age characteristics of the system are vastly different from the ac-
tivity profile of an infected system. 1his desirable characteristic.
however. is not always present. If the virus is cleverly written to
always stay within this normal profile. it may be difficult to detect
its presence using a monitor. For monitoring to be more effective.
users need to be better educated about the behavior and function-
ing ofviruses. They must know how their system works so they can
recognize suspicious activity when the software monitor fails. 3
The chief advantage of a properly implemented monitoring tech-
nique is that it works for all viruses - the ones currently known.
and the ones yet to be discovered. Furthermore. it can detect in-
fections before they occur. Unfortunately. to always detect these
infections. the sensitivity of the monitor must be set so high that
it may generate many false alarms from normal activity. Further-
more. such detectors must be installed at a low-level on the target
machine. and must always be run; an infected detector will not be
of practical use in preventing further infections!
2.2 Detection by emulation
In this scheme the program under test is emulated by the virus
detection program. which attempts to determine the run-time be-
havior of the program. 1his is different from monitoring in that
the program is not observed while it is actually executing but is
emulated with sample input(s). As in the case of monitors. if the
program attempts to change the interrupt vectors or open sensitive
files it should be deemed suspicious.
Detection by emulation cannot be "precise." That is. we cannot
always correctly decide whether the program behaves like a virus.
One difficulty in emulating a program is in determining suitable
input(s) for it and then emulating it with all the inputs to see if
any cause the program to exhibit a virus-like behavior. Timed or
context-sensitive behavior may be present that fools the emulator.
3(2) and (16) (for example) list practical steps that can be taken to educate users
against viral infections.
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Another difficulty is in deciding the granularity at which to emulate
the program. What is the highest granularity at which emulation
can be done to preserve the viral property of a program?
Few emulators for virus detection are in use today. The VProt
program by Fridrick Skulason for MS-DOS systems has this func-
tion as an option.
2.3 Detection by static analysis/policy adherence
This method examines a program to decide whether it meets a pre-
specified policy requirement, one which may include integrity re-
quirements for the detection of viruses. To determine whether an
arbitrary program contains a virus is undecidable [4J, but a con-
servative decision on the presence of viruses may be possible. For
example. Maria King [14J describes a technique by which programs
can be analyzed to determine whether they meet a prespecified pol-
icy.
A policy is specified as a regular expression and defines the char-
acteristics within which the programs being tested must lie in order
to fit the policy. The policy may be decided for the entire environ-
ment as a whole, may vary from machine to machine, or may be
written for clusters of machines. Once a policy is written for an en-
vironment, programs running in that environment can be checked
to see if their behavior fits the policy. This is a static process, not
done by monitoring the executing program, but writing a minispee
for the program and verifYing that the minispec fits the policy. A
minispec for a program is also written as a regular expression thus
making the verification straighforward. There exist well-known and
efficient algorithms to determine whether a regular language is a
subset of another regular language. The problem of verification is
reduced to finding whether the regular language generated by the
minispec is a subset of the regular language generated by the policy.
A minispec of a program is a subset of the behavior of the program.
This subset comprises the behavior of interest, such as the file ma-
nipulation properties of the program. The minispec is written from
the source code, design documentation, programmers' notes and
the test results of a program.
The chief disadvantage of this approach is that the source of
the program is required. The source, if shown to meet the policy
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requirements, must then be compiled by a trusted compiler before
being used or else the executable may not accurately reflect the
source. Furthermore, this method involves considerable overhead
to test and implement. It also requires that all monitored software
have a definable minispec. We are unaware of any existing system
that uses this mechanism.
2.4 Detection by checksumming
To protect programs against unwanted modification by viruses, a
checksum based on the contents of the program is computed and
stored in encrypted form within or outside the program. The en-
cryption is done using a one-way function so forgery of a correct
checksum after infection is computationally very hard. Before each
program is executed its checksum is recomputed, encrypted and
matched with the stored result. If the two values are identical the
chances of infection are very low: any mismatch implies an un-
wanted modification.
One problem with this approach is that it requires system sup-
port so the check and execution can be performed atomically. [15]
presents an excellent survey of checksumming techniques for virus
detection. However, the chief argument against checksumming is
that it cannot detect viral infection in an already infected file. It
can detect further infection but not any current infections prior to
generating the first checksum. There is also the danger of infection
from what Radai [15] calls an "ambiguity" virus, I.e. infections oc-
curring at the time of copying files or compilations. If an infection
occurred just after closing the file being written, the new checksum
will be different from the previous one, but there is no way to tell
whether infection has occurred.
Checksumming is also susceptible to the "backtrack" attack de-
scribed in [6]. In a backtrack attack on an executable protected by
an encrypted checksum, the executable is disassembled, the virus
incorporated into the source and then reassembled to produce a
new valid cryptographic checksum. In general the infection can
take place at any point prior to the generation of the checksum and
one can get to this point from either direction I.e. moving from the
source or the object module.
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2.5 Dynamic runtime program integrity check
The motivation behind this approach is to ensure the integrity of
an executable program while it is running or to detect infections
between a program's integrity check and execution. The basic idea
behind this approach is to precompute an encrypted checksum for
a predefined "granule" of the program. For example, precompute
an encrypted checksum for each basic block in the program and
store it with the basic block. Every time control flows to the top
of the basic block, recompute and match the encrypted checksum
with the stored checksum to verify integrity of the instructions in
the basic block. Refer to [6J for more information on this approach.
This scheme requires hardware support to run efficiently. Fur-
thermore, unless trusted read and checksum operations are avail-
able, this method will not work against stealth viruses. It also does
not work well in environments where program files modify them-
selves to save configuration information, as is the case in most PC
operating systems. Again, we know of no system using this method
for protection.
2.6 Detection by time stamp modification
This scheme, outlined in [17J, is very similar to detection by check-
summing in that the time of last modification of the program serves
the purpose of a checksum. The time of last modification of a pro-
gram is usually kept external to the environment storing the pro-
gram. At regular intervals the timestamps are matched to ascertain
integrity of the program. There should not be any means for the
virus to get to this file and modify it to destroy evidence of its activ-
ity. Another requirement of this scheme is that the time stamping
operation must be irreversible by any process in the system. For
example, the modification time of a UNIX inode cannot serve as a
timestamp mechanism of this type, because the system clock may
be set backwards, and because inodes may be written by access to
the raw disk. [9J
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2.7 Detection by signature scanning
Using the "signature" of a virus to detect its presence in an exe-
cutable is the simplest and most common approach to known virus
detection. Once a virus is isolated, a sequence of bytes (unique se-
quence) from its code is taken as the identifying string for that virus.
Programs (files) are checked for the presence of this signature and
flagged as being infected if they contain the sequence.
Signature extraction, however, is a difficult and time-consuming
process because it involves disassembling and debugging the infec-
tion to identify key portions of the virus. These portions are then
combined to form the signature. It is then necessary to test the
signature against a large library of programs to reduce the likeli-
hood of false positives occuring when the signature coincidentally
matches some production code. Signature scanning is based on
the assumption that the virus does not alter itself arbitrarily before
infecting another executable. For most viruses prevalent today,
regular expressions are sufficiently powerful to capture any such
changes.
Simple signatures are usually specified as a string of characters
in ASCII: A923BF7, for example. Signatures of this form that con-
tain fixed patterns of hex nibbles are simple to use with efficient
string matching algorithms. Unfortunately, for some viruses, these
fixed patterns are not sufficiently powerful to define the signature in
a compact way. For such viruses one would have to specify a large
number of fixed patterns to identify a single virus. For example,







and the virus modifies the data at locations A and B before copying
itself into another executable. For such a virus, a fixed sequence
of hex pattern digits cannot be specified in the signature if the in-
structions around the arbitrarily modified data were needed in the
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signature to uniquely identify the virus. For such viruses we may
specify the character? to signify any value for that position, Le.
equal to the regular expression [O-9A-F] in the signature.
More complicated patterns can be specified to ignore (up to) a
specified number of characters or an arbitraIy number ofvalues. In
general, the specification may be of the form {n, m}, which means
skip at least n characters (nibbles) and at most m values. A specifi-
cation {n} can signify an arbitrary number of nibbles 2: n.
The chief disadvantage of scanning as a means of virus detec-
tion is its inability to detect unknown or new viruses. Scanning also
fails with self-encrypted viruses. It also fails with executables com-
pressed with different compression techniques, making the same
virus appear different. Finally, as more viruses are discovered,
scanning algorithms tend to run more slowly because they must
try to match a larger set of possibilities. Also, the more signa-
tures there are, the more likely that any arbitrary signature will
also match some legitimate code in some application.
A further benefit to scanning is that it can also be used against
embedded trojan horse code, logic bombs, and other malicious soft-
ware in addition to simple viruses.4 All that is needed to detect
these pieces of code are appropriate signatures generated from a
disassembly. These signatures can be added to the search set and
used without any further change to the scanning software.
Cohen argues in [5] signature scanning is not worth pursuing
against computer viruses. He (correctly) observes that scanning
cannot find new viruses before their patterns are known, nor will
such methods work against self-encrypting viruses. He attempts to
show that an integrity shell (Le., checksUmming) is the most cost-
effective approach to virus protection. The argument in [5] is based
on some questionable data and assumptions, however, and is not at
all convincing. We believe that the cost-benefit ratio for scanners,
either by themselves or in addition to other mechanisms, is much
higher than he calculates. This is because of scanners' low impact
on existing practice and because of their flexibility. We believe that
their widespread use and continued effectiveness in the commercial
world affirm this view. Almost all currently available commercial
anti-virus tools use signature scanning as their primary detection
4See [7), [8), or [10) for definitions of these terms.
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method.
2.8 Summary of detection methods
Among all the methods of virus detection mentioned above, the
simplest and most economical for detecting the majority of cur-
rent viruses is signature scanning. While signature scanning may
not be able to detect all possible viruses, it is still simple and cheap
enough to be easily available and useful to the public at large, and
it has the least impact on existing code and hardware. Moreover, it
is simple to add new patterns to an existing scanner whenever new
viruses are discovered. Ifstealth techniques are thwarted, scanning
will work against the majority ofcommonviruses prevalent today. [3]
It is for these reasons that we decided to implement a generic sig-
nature scanner as our first anti-virus tool.
What follows is a brief description of the e++ classes used to
implement our scanner, the interface presented to the user, some
measurement results relating to the time and memory utilization of
running the scanner on a diskette containing a distribution of file
sizes and seeded infections.
3 Description of the tool
We present a brief overview of our scanning tool and give a descrip-
tion of the main e++ classes from which the program is structured.
e++ , being an object oriented language, permits data encapsula-
tion and abstraction, and we have tried to take full advantage of
these features in partitioning our data and functions. As a result,
we expect that future additions and modifications to this program
will not change the overall organization of data drastically. We also
chose to code in e++ because it will allow us to easily retarget the
scanner to different filetypes.
Our program has been written using AT&T e++ 2.1 on a Sun
SPARe running SunOS 4.1.1. There are no immediate plans to port
it to the GNU G++ version of the e++ language. Such a port should
not be difficult, however, as no external libraries have been used,
and we have used GNU-compatible features of the AT&T translator.
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3.1 A brief description of the classes used in the scanner
Perhaps the most significant class in the scanner is the abstract






String _name; //name of the virus
Table _aliases; //a table of aliases
String _sig;
//signature, stored in hex digits
//like 07AFB235
int _infects;
//interpreted in the derived class
public:
String& name() { return name; }
Table& aliases() { return aliases;
String sig() { return _sig; }
int& infects() { return _infects; }
void set_name(char *n) { name = n;
void add_alias (char *n)
String *t = new String(n);
_aliases.push(t);
}
void set_sig(char *n) {_sig n;}
virtual void print() = 0;
virtual int infects_ftype(String& fname)
0;
virtual -Virlnfo() { }
virtual void read (istream&) = 0;
//read virus info from input stream
} ;
All storage members of VirTnfo are protected to allow derived
classes access to them. Several public functions. for example name () ,
aliases (), sig (), infects () ... are defined in the abstract class.
These procedures are generic and the same for all derivations of
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VirInfo. All the undefined functions, except for the destructor,
are pure virtual. The input extractor function » is not a member
function and is defined to make a call to the pure virtual function
read () that must be defined appropriately in derived classes of
viruses. The function read () therefore encapsulate changes in the







The Type: field indicates the type ofvirus record. For the proto-
type we only have a DOS derived class ofVirInfo, but it is not diffi-
cult to add newer types in the future. Example extensions would be
for Amiga, Macintosh, and Atari file types, and for Unix executables
(if a non-experimental Unix virus ever appears).
Note that we can define our pattern alphabet and regular ex-
pression format over almost any alphabet we care to specify - it
does not matter for the design of the program. We have chosen to
define ours over hex digits (nibbles) because it is convenient, and
because we do not need to compensate for cross-architecture byte
order difficulties, as would be the case if we defined over 16 or 32
bit quantities. The patterns provided by others that we used in our
testing were defined in terms of hex digits, too.
The scanner starts by reading information about viruses from a
signature file containing entries of the type shown above. Depend-
ing on the value of the type field, objects representing these virus
types (subclasses of VirInfo) are created to represent each virus
record.
Once objects representing all the virus information in the input
file are created, a sparse trie is built to represent it. Each node of
the trie is an instance of class node (not described in this paper).
To each node of this tree is attached a list of viruses (a dynami-
cally resized table with elements of type VirInfo *) that match the
signature obtained by following the path from the root of the tree
(global variable TreeRoot) to this node. Each node in the tree has
a fan out of ~ 16, corresponding to each hex character [O-9A-F] in-
terpreted as a number plus any regular expressions that can match
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at this node. For each signature (regular expression), we follow this
tree edges from the root (TreeRoot), making transitions on each
"logical" character (%n, **, *n etc. count as one logical character)
of the signature. We create new nodes in the tree on encountering
leaf nodes, such that the path from the root of the tree to any given
node marks the signature of the virus pattern attached at that node.
Usually, leaf nodes specify signatures but if a signature is a prefix
of another, then the intermediate nodes can also specify signatures.
The algorithm, for inserting a signature in this globally accessible
tree, in pseudo code is:
node *t = root of the tree;
for (every character in the virus signature)
{
if(the character is a hexadecimal digit)
{
make a child of t
corresponding to this fixed nibble;
t = this child;
}
else if(the character is ?)
create a child of t labeled ?;
t = this child;
/* there may be several marked ?
if two signatures have a common
prefix including a ?
*/
}
else if(the next two characters are
of the form %d)
create a child of t labeled %;
t = this child;
/* there may be several
marked % similarly */
}
else if(the next two characters are
of the form *d)
create a child of t labeled *;
t = this child;
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/* there may be several
marked * similarly */
}
else if(the next two characters are
of the form **)
create a child of t labeled
t = this child;
**.,
add this regular expression at node t;









the tree looks like in figure 1.
There is also an ifNibbleStream class that accesses a file in
nibbles (characters) rather than bytes. This class can be used to
encapsulate the file I/O interface from the program. Our definition
is based on the ifstream class available with the AT&T C++ distri-
bution on UNIX. This class can save the current nibble position in
the file stream and restore it.
The class Directory recurses through a given file system (usu-
ally. directory tree) and generates the full pathnames of all the files
rooted at the tree. Names of files are returned by successive calls to
its member function next ( ). This class encapsulates the file sys-
tem interface and directory structure visible to the program. These
names are then used to open a "NibbleStream" so as to scan the







point to a list of virullelll






Figure 1: The node tree
Thus, whether the filenames are /homes/kumar/foo or \homes\kumar\foo
is completely transparent to the program and is completely encap-
sulated within the classes Directory and ifNibbleStream. The
scanner just requires a sequence of nibbles to do its matching, it
is unaware of the file name syntax or the mechanism of opening
and closing files. Not only does this allow complete independence
from the underlying file system, it allows the scanner to work on
encrypted, archived, and compressed files, so long as they can be
returned as a stream of 4-bit nibbles and can be recognized during
the filesystem scan.
3.2 Why is our scanner generic?
Our scanner is geneTic in the sense of and to the extent afforded by
an object oriented programming language. We mean that there are
no hardcoded dependencies that make it impossible to extend, and
that as a principle, the same routines can apply to newer types of
viruses, file systems, file formats etc. Whatever modifications may
be required to the code are minimal and quite structured.
We believe most of these features are well-supported with our
choice of the programming paradigm more than would be afford
by simply employing a disciplined programming style in a more
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conventional language. Consider, for example, how we might add a
new virus type foo in the scanner. We would derive a subclass foo of
the abstract class Virlnfo and define all the pure virtual functions
in the abstract class. The routine that reads the file containing the
signatures switches on the Type: information of the virus to create
objects of that type. This routine, of necessity, must be modified
to add another type so it can create objects of type foo when it
encounters a description of a virus of type foo. For the most part
this is all that needs to be done. All the modification to the code
is encapsulated inside the pure virtual functions and defining them
for foo is all that is required. The pattern matching function will
continue to work for foo.
Consider now, that the files to be scanned reside in a file system
which is quite like the UNIX file system except that the component
separator in a file name is \ instead of /. All the changes for this
case are encapsulated in the class Directory and the rest of the
program can probably run unmodified. Where genericity extends
encapsulation is in permitting a derived class of Directory to be
used wherever the class Directory was used, thus obviating the
direct alteration of the class Directory.
3.3 A brief description of the pattern matching algorithm
The following regular expressions are supported in the scanner,
the specification is as in TBSCAN. This algorithm is similar to the
Aho-Corasick algorithm [l), but it has been extended for wildcard
characters.
? match any nibble in the input stream
%n skip O-n nibbles in the input stream
*n skip exactly n nibbles
** skip an arbitrary number, including 0
The algorithm considers every nibble position in the input stream
as a possible beginning ofa virus sequence. For each such position,
it systematically maintains the set ofpossible signatures that match
as a prefix the input stream nibbles from that fixed position to the
current position. Matching stops when the nibble pattern from the
fixed position to the current position match any virus signature
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entirely. Backtracking can occur if signatures contain regular ex-
pression patterns ** & %n. Backtracking is currently implemented
in a straightforward manner using recursion; failure pointers can
be calculated. as explained in [1]. The current algorithm in pseu-
docode looks as follows:
for (each nibble in the input stream)
if (traverse (inputNibbleStream, TreeRoot))
{
1* virus detected *1;
node *traverse(ifNibbleStream& i, node& n)
if(there are virus signatures
associated with this node)return &n;
ch = next digit from the input stream;
pos = current nibble position of i;
if(there is a link on ch from n)
if(ret = traverse(i, the node found by
following the link from n
on ch))return ret;
for (all the %d, *d, ? & ** links of node n)
{
if(link is of type %d)
{
int k value of d;
for(int 1 = 0; 1 <= k; 1++)
{
restore file position to pos;
skip exactly 1 nibbles;
if(ret = traverse(i, the node
obtained by following
the link from n
on %d))return ret;
)
else if(link is of type *d)
II all? are converted to *1
{
restore file position to pos;
skip exactly d nibbles;
if(ret = traverse(i, the node
obtained by following
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the link from n
on *d»return ret;
)
else if(link is of type **)
for(int 1 = 0; not end of file; 1++)
{
restore file position to pos;
skip exactly 1 nibbles;
if(ret = traverse(i, the node
obtained by following
the link from n
on **»return ret;
restore file position to pos;
return 0;
The order in which the regular expression specifications are
stored in each node is significant. The search procedure is re-
cursive and always takes the leftmost unvisited path in the search
tree when trying to match a regular expression. This ordering en-
sures that patterns are matched in the order: [O-9A-F], ?, %n, *n
and **. While this order does not guarantee the shortest possi-
ble match if more than one exists, it does ensure that if the input
stream matches a fixed pattern, that pattern will be found first.
For the shortest possible match we would have to place %n and
** before the others because these expressions can match fewer
nibbles than ? or *n. The algorithm, being recursive, could then
end up trying all possible skips (with **) before matching an exact
skip equivalently specified by *n, which only appeared later in the
node. This is not as efficient, in the general case.
Thenode *traverse (ifnibblestream& if node& n) routine
returns a pointer to the node at which the (partial) signature formed
by starting at node n and traveling down the tree matches the in-
put nibble stream. If traverse (ifnibblestream& if node& n)
returns a non-null pointer, then there is a partial signature begin-
ning at node n that matches the input nibble stream. If it returns
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a null pointer, there is no remaining signature specification that
matches the input nibble stream, starting at node n.
For example, referring to fig. 1, ifthe current input nibble stream
is lA9CB and we call traverse () at node 2 then the input stream
nibbles lA match the partial signature (0) lA of virus pattern "A"
and a pointer to node 4 is returned. If the inputstream had been
lBA6... then a pointer to node 5 would be returned, in all other
cases NULL would be returned.
When traverse () returns successfully to the top level, it speci-
fies !! matched signature, not all the matched signatures. We don't
look for all possible Signatures in the input stream. We just answer
the question ofinfection, i.e., whether the input file contains a virus;
we do not enumerate all infections in a file. It is usually adequate
to know that a file is infected without knowing the number or types
of infections, because one can then discard it and by to restore an
uninfected copy of the file, rather than by to disinfect the file of all
its infections. If a list of all infections is desired, the scanner may
be restarted later in the file, after the current virus identification.
4 A prototype implementation and results
We have constructed a prototype version of this scanner under
SunOS to scan for viruses.
Our initial tests have been run on 1197 MS-DOS files known to
be infected with viruses. These files occupied 12.3 Mbytes of disk
space. We ran the scanner using two signature files. The first was
the signature set supplied with TBSCAN program, available from
many public ftp sites. The version of this used was the revision of
2/16/92. Our other set of signatures was obtained from the Virus
Bulletin complete update published in July 1991.
We ran our unoptimized scanner against our set of test infected
files. Our preliminary results are summarized in the table below:
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No. ofsigs CPU time ~ Rate
user + sys
1 17s 740.9KB/s
(TBSCAN) 347 10m52s 19.3KB/s
(VB) 317 4m35s 45.8KB/s
The CPU time includes the time for any scanner initialization,
reading the signature file, generating the node tree and the actual
scanning for patterns. The accuracy of virus detection in the files
(or "false positives") is not characterized as that is dependent on the
quality and number of signatures used: it is not a reflection on the
scanning mechanism per se.
The initialization overhead ofreading in the patterns and storing
them in the internal structure is very small - on the order of 7
seconds. As can be seen in the table, running over the entire test
tree took only 17 seconds with a single pattern of "1" (match any
nibble). Scanning over a larger pattern space takes longer because
more patterns must be matched. Furthermore, in the case of more
than a single pattern, we needed to read through more of each file
before a match was made.
The VB patterns contain fewer wildcard characters, and this
likely accounts for the difference in execution times between the
two pattern sets. When we implement the optimization of having
failure pointers in the scanning routine, we believe the scanning
time should decrease signifiantly for both sets of patterns. Fur-
thermore, some work to optimize the file system routines on our
system should also result in a significant speedup. We believe that
a scanning speed of over 50KB/second against 1000 patterns is
possible.
Unfortunately, we do not know how to adequately compare these
results with other scanners. The platform and language of imple-
mentation for commercial products are undoubtedly generally dif-
ferent and they are not available in source form. Reviews of com-
mercial products published in the Virus Bulletin report scanning
speeds from under 20 seconds to over an hour for multi-megabyte
sets of files on MS-DOS machines (cf., [11, 12] and [13] for recent
reviews). However, these measurements seem to be made on fewer
total files than our test set, as well as being under different operat-
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ing systems and file system organizations. For us to fairly make a
comparison would require that we port our scanner to a compara-
ble machine and run our tests there. something we may do in the
future.
5 Extensions/future work
Our initial implementation was written to test the generality of our
design. Although quite promising. we believe that it can be made
significantly faster with some further work. As such. we have iden-
tified some specific items we would like to address:
• Fallure pointers can be computed for each virus pattern so
while scanning a file for a particular fixed pattern one does not
have to rescan the input to search for virus patterns at every
intervening byte in the file. For example if the first n nibbles
of a particular virus pattern v (i.e. VI ••• vn ) match the file F at
nibbles j, j + 1, ... , j + n - 1 but mismatch at nibble n + 1 of
the pattern. i.e. nibble Vn+I. one does not necessarily have to
seek for virus matches at nibble j + 1 of the file because there
may not be any viruses with the prefix V2 ••• Vn • Instead. we
only need calculate the appropriate byte beginning the longest
matching suffix of the pattern matched so far. and restart the
scan with that. With the fallure function in place whenever
there is a mismatch in the input stream when compared with
the longest matching pattern. there will be a change in context
and an attempt to restart the scan without rereading the input
file. (See [1] for general details.)
• The pattern matcher can be extended on restricted forms of
regular expressions specified earlier in the paper. We could
use an AO* search technique to expand the most promising
node of the tree to find the virus. This could perhaps lead
to a fast probabilistic algorithm for virus detection if we can
get good probability values to affix at the tree nodes. perhaps
through a large survey of prevalent viral infections.
• New classes ifArcNibbleStream & ifZipNibbleStream can
be derived from ifNibbleStream that decode ARC and ZIP
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files on-the-fly to return decoded nibbles to the scanner. Be-
cause of the modular way in which the program is structured,
everything else should work without modification.
• Developing more efficient file reading routines, including some
that memory-map the input file rather than reading it into
intermediary buffers (the method used in the base stream ob-
jects).
We also intend to make the code available for beta test so as to
gain some further understanding of portability and interface con-
cerns by real users.
6 Conclusions
We believe that a generic scanner program can be an effective and
cost-efficient method ofvirus detection. By constructing a platform-
independent scanner, we obtain some automatic protection against
stealth and boot viruses that might otherwise make the scanning
suspect. Furthermore, by proper definition of the ilo routines, we
can scan file system blocks and structures that might not be acces-
sible to a program operating on the system being scanned.
Our approach of using an object-oriented design has proven to
be easy to develop and understand. We were able to get the program
operational in a short amount of time, and have found it simple to
load with several different sets of scan strings. By combining string
sets, we expect that coverage may be obtained in a manner superior
to most commercial scanners currently available.
We expect that our scanner may prove very useful when re-
leased, especially on systems that share multi-platform file sys-
tems, and which host archive sites. We expect that by making
this a freely-available program, others will contribute modules and
scanner strings to increase its usefulness and generality.
Avallabnity
Our eventual goal is to make the scanner program, as well as sev-
eral associated pattern files for different architectures, available to
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anyone who wants it. Interested parties are invited to contact the
authors for current status and availability information.
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